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only to a short-term cash savings program to pay
employee cost-of-living adjustments. Negative
perceptions of future goal achievement, a dimin-
ishing environmental stimulus, and jurisdictional
ambiguity between productivity and collective
bargaining issues indicate that a long-term produc-
tivity program would not succeed.
One obstacle is strong union dissatisfaction.
Two-thirds of union respondents believed that the
current program will disband after the agreement
expires. In fact, 73 percent of the labor cochairmen
interviewed agreed that the program will be
unnecessary when normal collective bargaining is
resumed. Because these cochairmen are local
union leaders, their dissatisfaction and lack of
commitment are definite weaknesses in the current
program. Their negative perceptions will affect
other labor participants in the program, as well as
the union's rank and file. E
-FOOTNOTE
The sample included 12 of the 26 participating agencies: Housing
and Development Administration, Human Resources, Personnel,
Environmental Protection, Law, Economic Development, Model
Cities, Parks, Police, Sanitation, Fire, and Corrections. Interviews
with city and union staff experts suggested that these included an even
mix of the most and least effective agency subcommittees.
Final-offer arbitration and salaries
of police and firefighters
DAVID B. LIPSKY AND THOMAS A. BAROCCI
Did final-offer arbitration have a discernible
impact on the salaries of police and firefighters in
Massachusetts during the 3-year trial period which
ended June 30, 1977? To analyze this question, we
collected information on the maximum salary paid
to police patrolmen, police sergeants, firefighters,
and fire lieutenants for a large sample of Massa-
chusetts municipalities. We integrated these data
with police and fire impasse experiences and added
several economic and environmental characteris-
tics for each Massachusetts municipality. Then we
performed several tests of the economic impact of
final-offer arbitration.
In the first test, we compared police and
David B. Lipsky is an associate professor at the New York State
School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, and
Thomas A. Barocci is assistant professor of industrial relations at
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Table 1. Percent Increases in police and fire salaries,
selected areas, 1973-76
Area 1973 1974 1975 1976
Massachusetts:
Patrolmen --------------------- 60 69 8.4 7.5
Police sergeants ------------------- ------ 8.0 8.7 9.0
Firefighters ------------------------ --------- 7.0 7.3 7.6
Fire lieutenants -------------------- --------- 8.1 7.8 8.2
New York:
Patrolmen .......................... 7.2 8.8 ---------
Firefighters --------..----........... 7 0 7.9 ---------
Northeastern cities:
Patrolmen ------------------------- 6.2 1 3.2 86 -- --
Firefighters ......................... 6.6 3 5 6 1
NOTE: Dashes indicate data not available.
firefighter salary increases in Massachusetts for the
period 1973 (or 1974) through 1976 with compara-
ble salary increases in New York State and
Northeastern cities with populations of 100,000 or
more (table 1). Police and fire salary changes in
Massachusetts were generally higher in 1975 and
1976 than they had been in 1974, and for police
patrolmen, in 1973. But it is also true that public
safety employee salary settlements were higher in
both New York State municipalities and large
Northeastern cities in 1975 than they had been in
1974. Note, for example, that in 1974, the year
preceding the availability of final-offer arbitration
in Massachusetts, the percentage increases in
police and fire salaries were at least double those
for large Northeastern cities, while in 1975, the
differences were considerably smaller, although
still favorable to the uniform officers of Massachu-
setts.
Given the limitations of using large Northeast-
ern cities as a basis for comparison with Massa-
chusetts municipalities of all sizes, it is probably
more instructive to examine the New York data.
New York State, like Massachusetts, used factfind-
ing to resolve public safety disputes in the 1973-74
period. The data, although incomplete, indicate
that there was very little difference in police and
fire salary settlements between the two neighbor-
ing States in 1973-74. (Police patrolmen in New
York appear to have done slightly better than their
counterparts in Massachusetts.) An approximate
estimate of the impact of using final-offer arbitra-
tion versus conventional arbitration can be ob-
tained by comparing Massachusetts and New
York data for 1975. This comparison shows that
patrolmen and firefighters in New York won
somewhat higher salary settlements than their
counterparts in Massachusetts. The differences are
so minor, however (about one-half of one percent-
age point), that it is not prudent to conclude that
HeinOnline  -- 101 Monthly Lab. Rev. 34 1978
the Massachusetts final-offer arbitration statute
had an impact on salaries that differed from the
New York conventional arbitration statute.
Clearly, there was some factor (or set of factors)
that operated in Massachusetts, New York, and
the large Northeastern cities to raise policy and fire
salary settlements in 1975 to a higher level than
existed in 1974. Only a more thorough analysis
would reveal that factor.
In a second test of the salary effects of final-offer
arbitration, we cross-tabulated percentage changes
in police and fire salaries by stage of settlement.
We compared the results with those for New York
State (table 2). Applying Chi-square tests to the
data, we were able to find a significant association
between salary awards made in arbitration and
salary settlements achieved without arbitration. To
be sure, there are instances where settling at some
stage other than arbitration seems to be associated
with a higher or lower percentage increase in
salary. For example, police sergeants in 1975 who
settled in mediation clearly did better than their
counterparts who settled without impasse, in
factfinding, or in arbitration in that year. But these
effects are not systematic in nature, so it is not
possible to claim a consistent relationship between
any stage of settlement and the level of salary
Table 2. Relationship between stage of settlement and
percent change In police and fire salaries, selected
areas, 1974-76
Stage of settlement
Area
No Impasse Mediation Facttinding Arbitration
Massachusetts
1974'
Police (patrol) ......... 70 7.3 57 (1)
Polce sergeants .... _ 79 84 8.8 (')
Firefighters ------------ 6.9 5.6 10.2 (1)
Fire lieutenants 82 5.3 9.6 ()
1975
Police (patrol) ......... 8.2 10.2 6.8 8.1
Police sergeants ---.... 8.6 12.1 5.9 7.6
Firefighters --------.---- 74 7 1 6.4 81
Fire lieutenants -- - 75 89 63 8.2
1976
Police (patrol) --------- 76 72 (2) (2)
Police sergeants ------- 9.2 8.4 (2) (2)
Firefighters ......---- 7.4 88 6.6 8.0
Fire lieutenants 95 3.1 5.7 58
New York
1975.
Police (patrol) ......... 8.1 10.6 68 8.2
Firefighters ------------- 7,7 8.2 84 7.9
Not applicable.
As the table is derived from the merger of the impasse data collected from State files and
contract data collected independently, we are only able to report salary changes where we have
been able to match the two sets Therefore, there are not observations for settlements reached in
fact-finding and arbitration for police patrol and sergeant in 1976
NOTE New York data are from Thomas A Kochan and others, An Evaluation of Impasse
Procedures for Police and Firehghters in New York State (New York State School of Industrial and
Labor Relations, Cornell University), p. 210, table 6-18
increase. Note that similar results were found for
New York patrolmen and firefighters in 1975.
Certainly, the stage of settlement is not the only
factor affecting the level of salary settlements in
police and fire negotiations. In order to assess the
independent influence of arbitration and other
impasse steps on the salary outcomes of bargain-
ing, we tested a series of multiple regression
equations in which percentage salary change for a
particular public safety employee group in a
particular year was the dependent variable and the
independent variables included a number of
economic and institutional variables hypothesized
to influence salary changes (such as population of
the town or city, full value of assessments per
capita, State aid, median income). Evaluation of
the arbitration and impasse coefficients in these
equations confirmed the impressions gathered
from table 2; that is, stage of settlement in
negotiations involving patrolmen and firefighters
(the vast majority of uniformed employees) had no
significant influence on the magnitude of their
salary settlements, even when other relevant salary
determinants are held constant.'
It might be claimed that the lack of a significant
difference in arbitrated settlements is the result of
the pattern-setting nature of the arbitration
awards. Spillover from arbitrated awards to settle-
ments achieved short of arbitration may have
obliterated the effect that the arbitration statute
had on all police and fire salary changes in
Massachusetts. We cannot rebut this argument,
but we doubt that it is true. First, our research
showed that arbitrated awards were generally
determined in the factfinding process. To support
the spillover hypothesis, one would have to show
that factfinders made recommendations that were
higher than they would have been in the absence of
the statute. But comparison of factfinders' recom-
mendations before and after the law was passed
provides no support for this proposition. Second,
the average time that elapsed from the declaration
of an impasse to an arbitration award was 12
months. On the other hand, settlements reached in
mediation and factfinding occurred, on average,
from 2 to 9 months after the declaration of
impasse. Thus, in a given year most settlements
in mediation and factfinding were reached before
most of the arbitration awards were handed down.
It was literally impossible for most arbitration
awards to serve as pattern setters for other
settlements achieved short of arbitration in the
same negotiating year (although it is possible that
arbitrated awards in 1 year set patterns that were
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followed in the next year's police and fire negotia-
tions).
The only other studies of the direct effect of
arbitration on the salaries of police and firefighters
are by James L. Stern and others of the experience
in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania and by
Thomas A. Kochan and others of the experience in
New York.3 The Stern study found that the
"preponderance of evidence makes it reasonable to
conclude that the institution of final-offer arbitra-
tion tended to raise the salaries of the policy and
firefighters in Michigan and Wisconsin by more
than 1 but less than 5 percent and that the positive
effect was much smaller, if it was present at all, in
the subsequent year." The Kochan study con-
cludes, "Our tests for the impact of the change in
the legislation per se indicated that, on average, the
existence of arbitration had a small positive, but
generally insignificant, effect on the size of the
wage increases obtained." In similar fashion, our
study does not support the notion that the addition
of final-offer arbitration to the array of impasse
procedures available to Massachusetts public
safety employees had a significantly positive effect
on their salaries. El
-FOOTNOTES
'In the case of one regression-for fire lieutenants-we found that
the use of arbitration had a statistically significant impact on salary
changes in 1975-76. These results are reported more fully in David B.
Lipsky and Thomas A. Barocci, The Impact of Final Offer Arbitration
in Massachusetts: an Analysis of Police and Firefighter Collective
Bargaining (Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology), working paper 941-77, May 1977.
2For the experience with time spans and delays under arbitration in
New York, Pennsylvania, and Michigan, see Thomas A. Kochan and
others, An Evaluation of Impasse Procedures for Police and Firefighters
in New York State (New York State School of Industrial and Labor
Relations, Cornell University), pp. 301-04 and Mollie H. Bowers, "A
Study of Legislated Interest Arbitration in the Public Safety Services
in Michigan and Pennsylvania," Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell Universi-
ty, 1973.
3James L. Stern and others, Final-Offer Arbitration (Lexington,
Mass., D.C. Heath, 1975) and Thomas A. Kochan and others, An
Evaluation of Impasse Procedures for Police and Firefighters in New
York State.
Utilization of health personnel
There are a number of important factors that
affect the utilization of health care employees by
hospitals, the major employers of the industry. One is
the hiring-in standards for entry-level positions. As is
relatively common in many industries, hospitals
generally set a high school diploma as a minimum
requirement for even the least skilled job in the
health care structure of positions. This is not a
uniform practice, but most hospitals use such a
standard even where it is not clearly job-related, and
the result is to exclude large numbers of the
disadvantaged from the industry.
A second factor affecting the utilization of health
care employees is the failure of the industry to utilize
occupations in accordance with the education,
training, and skills required of persons in those
occupations. There is a substantial overlapping of
functions among various occupations, from entry-
level to highly skilled, with little if any effort to
rationalize the occupational structure.
A third factor is the rigid qualifying requirements
established by a growing number of occupations,
under the guise of professionalism, through such
means as licensing and certification. Such qualifying
requirements have made both vertical and lateral
mobility exceedingly difficult. In many instances the
training and experience gained in one occupation are
not counted toward the requirements of another
related occupation.
The general result of these factors is that disadvan-
taged persons and members of ethnic minorities who
have little education find it difficult to break into the
industry; and when they do it is almost always at
entry-level positions that turn out to be low-paying,
dead-end jobs. And because of the practice of
permitting or fostering the overlap of functions
among occupations, persons in entry-level positions
often find themselves performing relatively high-level
functions without the higher pay or the higher job
classification title. After years of experience on the
job, the only way of getting a promotion is to leave
the job and enter an institutional training program.
In all these ways, the cards are stacked against the
disadvantaged and minority-group members who
have little education.
-HAROLD M. GOLDSTEIN AND MORRIS A.
HOROWITZ
Entry-Level Health Occupations: Development and Fu-
ture. (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1977), pp. 28-29.
HeinOnline  -- 101 Monthly Lab. Rev. 36 1978
